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O P I N I O N 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 From 2006 through 2011, Appellant Randy Poulson 
tricked homeowners facing foreclosure into selling him their 
homes and engaged in a multi-million-dollar Ponzi scheme 
that defrauded investors in those distressed properties.  
Poulson pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the District Court calculated his 
total fraud to be $2,721,240.94.  The District Court concluded 
that this fraud resulted in “substantial financial hardship” for 
more than twenty-five victims.  The District Court 
accordingly sentenced Poulson to 70 months’ imprisonment 
followed by three years of supervised release.  As a condition 
of supervised release, the District Court prohibited Poulson 
from working in the real estate industry for five years.    
Poulson now appeals, urging that the District Court erred with 
respect to two aspects of his sentence:  (1) the District Court’s 
determination of the number of victims who, as a result of 
Poulson’s fraud, suffered a “substantial financial hardship” 
under § 2B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”), and (2) the District Court’s imposition of a 
five-year occupational restriction as part of the terms of his 
supervised release.  Because we conclude that the District 
Court properly used the considerable discretion afforded to it 
by § 2B1.1, we will affirm the District Court’s finding as to 
the number of victims who endured a “substantial financial 
hardship” under the Guidelines.  We agree with Poulson, 
however, that the District Court erred in imposing the five-
year occupational restriction on his three-year term of 
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supervised release, and we will vacate and remand the case to 
the District Court to correct the sentence with respect to the 
terms of Poulson’s supervised release only.  
 
I. 
 Beginning around July 2006, Poulson used a variety of 
sources to construct and perpetuate a fraudulent real estate 
investment scheme.  Poulson targeted homeowners facing 
foreclosure on their properties and offered to purchase the 
deeds to their residences, falsely promising that he would pay 
their mortgages in return for the sales.  He conducted these 
transactions through Equity Capital Investments, LLC 
(“Equity Capital”), a limited liability real estate investment 
company that he established.  Poulson ultimately acquired the 
deeds to more than twenty-five distressed homeowners’ 
residences.   
 
 Poulson also established Poulson Russo LLC, a real 
estate investment education company through which he 
organized speeches, seminars, monthly dinners, and private 
tutorials that purported to teach real estate investing tips to 
individuals who paid fees to attend the events.  Poulson 
solicited the attendees at these events to invest in Equity 
Capital and falsely claimed in written and oral materials that 
the investors’ money would be used to fund the purchase, 
maintenance, and improvement of specific residential 
properties.  He also drew on his contacts from the South 
Jersey Real Estate Investors Association, where he had 
previously served as president, as well as on family and 
friends.   
 Poulson ultimately convinced over fifty people to 
invest in Equity Capital, and those investors sent him their 
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money either by wire transfer or through the U.S. Postal 
Service.  Poulson promised them that their money would be 
used to purchase and improve properties, which would then 
be rented, and he assured them that their investments would 
be secured by mortgages.  The investors typically executed 
promissory notes with Equity Capital that guaranteed a 10% 
to 20% return, monthly interest payments, and a fixed 
maturity date.  Poulson used the properties he had purchased 
from the distressed homeowners to secure the promissory 
notes, but with a group of over fifty investors, he often 
used—unbeknownst to them—the same properties to secure 
multiple investments.  Poulson also used the funds invested to 
finance his personal expenses.   
 
 When this “business model” began to “unravel and fall 
apart,” A. 213, Poulson fashioned a classic Ponzi scheme and 
used newly obtained money to repay earlier investors.  The 
scheme soon collapsed, eventually leading Poulson to stop 
paying the monthly mortgages on the properties and causing 
those mortgages to go into foreclosure—all without the 
distressed homeowners’ knowledge.  Poulson’s fraud 
ultimately cost over fifty of his investors more than $2.7 
million.   
 
 On June 23, 2015, Poulson pleaded guilty to one count 
of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  Poulson’s 
sentencing took place over the course of two days.  At the 
first sentencing hearing, held on December 16, 2015, the 
District Court recognized that the term “substantial financial 
hardship” was a “new provision” in the 2015 Guidelines that 
increases an offense level based on the extent of harm that 
particular victims suffer as opposed to the previous version of 
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the enhancement that looked primarily at the total number of 
victims.1  (A. 116.)  
 
At the second sentencing hearing on January 20, 2016, 
the District Court addressed Poulson’s objection regarding the 
application of § 2B1.1 as it related to certain victims.  The 
District Court examined the contours of the newly amended 
enhancement and rejected Poulson’s contention that it needed 
to know “how much money [each victim] started with” in 
order to determine whether a “substantial financial hardship” 
occurred.  (A. 169.)  The District Court reasoned: 
 
I don’t care if it was someone who started with 
a million dollars or a hundred thousand dollars, 
if they filed for bankruptcy because they lost 
their money they qualified. . . . It is hard to 
envision that what is contemplated by this 
[G]uideline is that the victims must come 
forward and lay out their financial wherewithal. 
. . . It seems to me that if victims fill out a 
victim statement or a victim declaration and say 
that they lost their retirement funds, not all but 
some, that they had to file bankruptcy, that they 
had to move in with their daughter or whatever, 
                                              
1 Poulson’s plea agreement, dated March 27, 2015, 
predated the amended enhancement, which took effect on 
November 1, 2015, and therefore the parties did not have an 
opportunity to consider the application of “substantial 
financial hardship” to the victims of Poulson’s fraud.   
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that those are substantial financial hardships.  
We’re not talking about the Donald Trumps. 
 
(A. 170–71.)  The District Court then reviewed and 
incorporated the impact statements submitted by the victims 
into its findings, using them to determine whether each victim 
suffered a “substantial financial hardship.”  It ultimately 
found that at least twenty-five victims had experienced this 
type of harm. 
 
The District Court’s computation of Poulson’s offense 
level under the 2015 Guidelines2 went as follows:  Poulson’s 
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 put him at a base offense 
level of seven.  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1).  The District Court 
found that the amount of the loss ranged between $1.5 million 
and $3.5 million, increasing the offense level by sixteen, 
                                              
2 The District Court also engaged in a lengthy discussion 
with counsel about which version of the Guidelines to use.  
Both the 2009 and the 2015 versions were potentially 
applicable, the former being in effect at the time of Poulson’s 
offense and the latter at the time of his sentencing.  However, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11, sentencing courts are to use 
the Guideline Manual in effect at the time of sentencing 
unless doing so would run afoul of due process.  U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.11(a)–(b)(1).  The District Court calculated Poulson’s 
offense level under each version and then compared the two 
outcomes.  The District Court, with the parties’ consent, 
reasoned through Poulson’s sentence based on the 2015 
version of the Guidelines and looked to the nature of the 
hardship, not merely the number of victims.   
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U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (b)(1)(I), and that over twenty-five 
investors endured a “substantial financial hardship,” 
increasing the offense level by six, U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1(b)(2)(C).  The District Court also found that the 
“sophisticated means” and “obstruction of justice” 
enhancements, which would have each increased the offense 
level by two, U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(b)(10) and 3C1.1, did not 
apply.  With the total offense level then at 29, the District 
Court found that Poulson deserved credit for accepting 
responsibility under U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b), and it 
reduced the offense level to twenty-six.  This calculation 
placed Poulson’s sentence in a range of 63 to 78 months’ 
imprisonment under the Guidelines.  The District Court then 
analyzed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and sentenced 
Poulson to 70 months’ imprisonment followed by three years 
of supervised release with an occupational restriction that 
barred him from working in the real estate industry for five 
years.3  This timely appealed followed.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
3 The District court also ordered Poulson to conduct 100 
hours of community service and to pay restitution to victims 
and a $100 special assessment.   
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II.4    
A.  “Substantial Financial Hardship” 
 Poulson challenges the District Court’s application of 
the § 2B1.1 enhancement based on eight victims who Poulson 
contends did not suffer the level of “substantial financial 
hardship” contemplated by the Guidelines.  If the District 
Court had correctly applied the enhancement, Poulson argues, 
“it would have counted fewer than 25 victims who suffered 
such hardship, and thus it would not have triggered the 6-
level increase.”  (Appellant’s Br. 11.)  We will first address 
the enhancement in general and then turn to the specific 
victims whose inclusion Poulson challenges.  
 
Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines provides for increased 
offense levels for economic crimes that “result[] in substantial 
financial hardship” to victims.  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)–
(C).  This enhancement is a recent addition to the Guidelines 
that took effect on November 1, 2015.  It advises sentencing 
courts to consider the extent of the harm rather than merely 
the total number of victims of the offense (as its predecessor 
did) in an effort to “place greater emphasis on the extent of 
harm that particular victims suffer as a result of the offense.”  
Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 25,782, 25,791 (May 5, 2015).  The newly amended § 
2B1.1 is thus “[c]onsistent with the Commission’s overall 
                                              
4 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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goal of focusing more on victim harm” and “ensures that an 
offense that results in even one victim suffering substantial 
financial harm receives increased punishment, while also 
lessening the cumulative impact of loss and the number of 
victims, particularly in high-loss cases.”  United States 
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Supplement to 
Appendix C 112–13 (Nov. 1, 2015).   
 
Though § 2B1.1 “effect[ed] a substantive change” to 
the Guidelines, United States v. Jesurum, 819 F.3d 667, 672 
(2d Cir. 2016), our Court has not yet had the opportunity to 
consider it, and the challenge to its application presents us 
with an issue of first impression.  Despite the scarcity of 
relevant case law, Application Note 4(F) offers instructive 
commentary that sentencing courts are required to consider 
when applying § 2B1.1.  See United States v. Knobloch, 131 
F.3d 366, 372 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Courts are required to follow 
the Application Notes . . . in imposing sentences for federal 
offenses.”); see also United States v. Minhas, 850 F.3d 873, 
877 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting the authority of the application 
notes in the context of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)).  Application 
Note 4(F) states: 
 
In determining whether the offense resulted in 
substantial financial hardship to a victim, the 
court shall consider, among other factors, 
whether the offense resulted in the victim— 
 
(i) becoming insolvent;  
(ii) filing for bankruptcy under the 
Bankruptcy Code . . . ; 
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(iii) suffering substantial loss of a 
retirement, education, or other savings or 
investment fund;  
(iv) making substantial changes to his or 
her employment, such as postponing his 
or her retirement plans;  
(v) making substantial changes to his or 
her living arrangements, such as 
relocating to a less expensive home; and  
(vi) suffering substantial harm to his or 
her ability to obtain credit. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(2) cmt. n.4 (emphasis added); see also 
U.S.S.G. App. C at 112 (referring to Application Note 4(F)’s 
list of factors that courts consider in assessing “substantial 
financial hardship” as “non-exhaustive”).5  
                                              
5 Poulson urges that there are “three key insights” to glean 
from the texts of § 2B1.1 and Application Note 4(F):  (1) the 
victim must have suffered “qualitative harm” over and above 
the loss itself (Appellant’s Br. 14); (2) the harm must be 
monetary, so “non-pecuniary harms, such as personal or 
familial distress, . . . do not qualify” (id. at 15); and (3) the 
hardship must be “large enough to trigger a significant change 
in life circumstances” (id.).  These “insights” are unavailing, 
as they are based solely on a discrete set of factors despite the 
fact that the set is not exhaustive.  More specifically, the 
“insights” overlook Application Note 4(F)(iii), i.e., the factor 
listing “substantial loss of a retirement, education, or other 
savings or investment fund.”  The Commission’s inclusion of 
this factor neither requires a “qualitative harm” nor 
necessarily “trigger[s] a significant change in life 
circumstances.” 
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 We agree with the observation by our sister circuits 
that the determination of “substantial financial hardship” is 
subject to the usual—and significant—degree of discretion 
afforded a district court during sentencing: 
 
[B]etween a minimal loss or hardship 
(occurring, perhaps, when a defendant 
fraudulently obtains five dollars a victim had 
intended to donate to charity), and a devastating 
loss (occurring in the wake of a scheme to wipe 
out of a victim’s life savings), there lies a wide 
range in which we rely upon the judgment of 
the district courts, guided by the non-exhaustive 
list of factors in Application Note 4[(F)].  In the 
end, this is just one more determination of a fact 
that bears on the ultimate sentence; that 
determination is entitled to the normal 
deference that applies to all facts found at 
sentencing. 
 
Minhas, 850 F.3d at 878; see also United States v. Brandriet, 
840 F.3d 558, 561–62 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting that even 
though the district court relied on a “thin” evidentiary record 
as well as its own inference to determine “substantial 
financial hardship,” it was not clear error for it to have done 
so). 
 
That discretion is crucial, as § 2B1.1’s increased 
emphasis on individual harm means that “substantial financial 
hardship” is measured on a sliding scale that is also fairly 
subjective.  We echo the analysis by the Seventh Circuit that: 
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The 2015 amendment to § 2B1.1(b)(2) 
introduces a measure of relativity into the 
inquiry.  That is, whether a loss has resulted in a 
substantial hardship . . . will, in most cases, be 
gauged relative to each victim.  The same dollar 
harm to one victim may result in a substantial 
financial hardship, while for another it may be 
only a minor hiccup.  Much of this will turn on 
a victim’s financial circumstances, as the 
district court recognized when it noted that “[a] 
loss that may not be substantial to Bill Gates 
may be substantial to a working person.” 
 
Minhas, 850 F.3d at 877–78.6  Still, this “measure of 
relativity” does not require the sentencing court to identify 
                                              
6 We are not persuaded by Poulson’s attempt to 
distinguish Minhas on the basis that the District Court in our 
case “specifically rejected” the argument that “substantial 
financial hardship” was a “relative term.”  Poulson Rule 28j 
Letter dated Mar. 30, 2017, at 1.  Nor do we view the District 
Court’s approach in our case as incompatible with that taken 
in Minhas.  While we agree with Minhas that the severity of a 
financial hardship generally depends on both the value of the 
loss and the victim’s financial means (and is therefore 
“relative” to the victim’s wealth), 850 F.3d at 877, the 
determination of “substantial financial hardship” is not based 
on those numbers alone.  Just as the Guidelines do not require 
a specific dollar amount to qualify as a “substantial financial 
hardship,” they also do not require the loss of a specific 
percentage of the victim’s wealth.  The District Court in this 
case took direct account of the impact of each victim’s loss on 
his or her overall financial health and appropriately used its 
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finite dollar amounts—the amount a victim started with and 
then ended up with after the fraud—when it measures 
“substantial financial hardship.”  To the contrary, it is 
axiomatic that sentencing courts may draw reasonable 
inferences from the factual record before them.  See United 
States v. Cicirello, 301 F.3d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
sentencing court is always free to draw inferences from facts 
of record . . . .”); see also United States v. Loney, 219 F.3d 
281, 288 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that the district court drew 
reasonable inferences when it found a relationship between 
defendant’s gun possession and his drug possession).  
Sentencing courts may therefore look at the factual record to 
infer the extent of the financial loss endured by a particular 
victim, and the District Court acted within the discretion 
afforded by the Guidelines when it did so here.  
 
We note that in other legal contexts, the word 
“substantial” has been treated as occupying a middle ground, 
with courts typically focusing on magnitude and permanence 
                                                                                                     
discretion to infer the magnitude of financial hardship based 
on the actions each victim was forced to take as a result.  In 
other words, it determined the nature of each victim’s loss 
relative to his or her personal circumstances.  Further, the 
District Court arguably construed the Guidelines more strictly 
than the court in Minhas.  In contrast to the sentencing court 
in Minhas, which held “it was more likely than not” that 
certain victims qualified for the § 2B1.1 enhancement, 850 
F.3d at 879, the District Court in this case made 
individualized findings after reviewing each victim’s loss 
amount and impact statement.   
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to determine substantiality.  When applied to evidence, for 
example, “substantial” means “more than a mere scintilla,” 
Plummmer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), “not overwhelming,” 
Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1988), and 
enough that a “reasoning mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion,” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 
(3d Cir. 1981).  Other circuits have held that a “substantial” 
financial hardship in the tax payment context must be more 
than a mere inconvenience, but rather a form of “sacrifice.”  
See Matter of Carlson v. United States, 126 F.3d 915, 921 
(7th Cir. 1997).  More broadly, Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “substantial” as “having actual, not fictitious, 
existence”; “of real worth and importance”; “considerable in 
amount or value”; and “having permanence or near-
permanence; long lasting.”7  Substantial, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  When applying the term to 
financial hardship in the sentencing context, therefore, we 
ought to consider not only the pecuniary value of the loss but 
also such intangibles as its impact on the victim.  A loss of a 
large volume of savings that is quickly regained or has 
minimal effect on the victim is likely not a substantial 
financial hardship.  As when using “substantial” in other 
                                              
7 When a statutory term is undefined, we give it its 
ordinary meaning.  United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 
511; Cadapan v. Att’y Gen., 749 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 
2014).  We may refer to legal and general dictionaries to 
ascertain the ordinary meaning of a term.  Pa., Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.3d 
506, 511 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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contexts, so too here, there is no specific percentage of total 
earnings or duration of impact that demarcates a substantial 
financial hardship from an insubstantial one.  The term’s 
fluidity across various legal applications thus buttresses the 
conclusion of the District Court and of other courts that 
drawing inferences based on a variety of facts is appropriate 
in construing “substantial financial hardship.” 
 
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the 
specific victims who Poulson argues did not endure 
“substantial financial hardship” as defined by the Guidelines.8  
                                              
8 Of the eight victims in question, three—LF, CS, and 
NN—lost money in accounts that were joint with their 
respective spouses.  The District Court counted each couple 
as one victim but recognized that it could have counted them 
separately.  If the District Court had counted the married 
couples as two separate victims, the total number of victims 
would have been 33 instead of 27.  Poulson does not directly 
challenge the District Court’s (unexplained) decision to count 
this way, and only argues that if we find that each victim 
should have been counted individually, then we “should 
remand the case for further proceedings, as there is 
insufficient evidence in the record to determine the nature of 
the couples’ joint accounts and the spouses’ individual 
hardships.”  (Appellant’s Br. 18–19 n.6.)  We disagree with 
that characterization of the record and note—as the District 
Court recognized during sentencing—that the District Court 
could have counted each married victim separately despite the 
titling of their account.  See United States v. Ryan, 806 F.3d 
691, 694 (2d Cir. 2015).  Though the commentary to § 2B1.1 
defines a “victim” as “any person who sustained any part of 
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The applicable standard of review depends on whether 
Poulson raised his objection to the victim in question before 
the District Court.  “Where an objection is preserved at 
sentencing,” as Poulson’s was with respect to CD and LF, 
“we exercise plenary review of a district court’s interpretation 
of the Guidelines but review its factual findings for clear 
error.”  United States v. Fountain, 792 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 
2015).  Because we are tasked with reviewing the District 
Court’s interpretation of “substantial financial hardship” 
under the Guidelines, we exercise plenary review over the 
challenge to the enhancement insofar as it is based on CD and 
LF.9  See United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 
                                                                                                     
the actual loss,” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1, the District Court 
was not required to count each spouse separately.   
9 The Government is incorrect that the clear error standard 
governs our review of Poulson’s challenge to the 
enhancement as based on CD and LF.  As the Government 
rightly notes, we have consistently held that “[i]f the facts 
underlying a Guidelines determination are not in dispute, ‘but 
the issue is whether the agreed-upon set of facts fit within the 
enhancement requirements,’ we review the District Court’s 
application of the enhancement for clear error.”  Fountain, 
792 F.3d at 318 (quoting United States v. Fish, 731 F.3d 277, 
279 (3d Cir. 2013)).  But that is not the issue presented to us.  
Poulson’s appeal tasks us with reviewing the contours of § 
2B1.1 as well as whether the District Court construed the 
amended enhancement correctly when assessing the 
magnitude of CD’s and LF’s respective losses.  That is not 
the same as determining whether undisputed facts align 
correctly with specific statutory requirements. 
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2015) (“When the calculation of the correct Guidelines range 
turns on an interpretation of ‘what constitutes loss’ under the 
Guidelines, we exercise plenary review.”); United States v. 
Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 309 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The appropriate 
standard of review of a district court’s decision regarding the 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines . . . is plenary.”); 
United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“The District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines is subject to plenary review.”). 
 
 Poulson did not contest the District Court’s inclusion 
of the remaining six victims—BDA, SP, CS, SB, NN, and 
SO—at sentencing.  We therefore review the application of 
the enhancement as it relates to those victims for plain error.  
United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766, 773 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(citing United States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 
2007)).  To prevail on these six challenges, therefore, Poulson 
must show that there is “(1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that 
affects substantial rights; and (4) which seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  Id.  It is not sufficient if the legal error is 
“subject to reasonable dispute.”  Puckett v. United States, 556 
U.S. 129, 135 (2009).  Even if Poulson satisfies those four 
requirements, we may still deny his challenge.  See United 
States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 192, 211 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1993). 
 
 Finally, we note that we may “affirm the rulings of the 
District Court for any proper reason that appears on the 
record even where not relied on by it.”  United States v. 
Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 337 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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i.  Victims CD and LF10 
 CD lost $60,000 in retirement savings to Poulson and 
successfully obtained a $124,184.60 civil judgment against 
him that included the $60,000 lost principal as well as the 
promised interest.  In finding that CD had endured a  
“substantial financial hardship,” the District Court counted 
the fact that she “was forced to file a civil lawsuit,” noting 
that it was not an “enumerated factor under the [G]uidelines” 
but that the factors listed in the Guidelines were not 
exclusive.  (A. 183.)  LF lost $70,661 in a retirement/savings 
fund, and the District Court noted that “[she] now ha[s] to 
work longer to make up for the money.”  (A. 184.) In 
addressing Poulson’s objection to these victims at the hearing, 
the District Court also noted that it was “call[ing] out . . . 
important facts, not necessarily the only important facts.”  (A. 
193.)   
 
 Poulson argues on appeal that in CD’s case, the 
monetary loss did not amount to a “significant life 
consequence, or ‘hardship’” (Appellant’s Br. 16), and that 
mere “impact[]” to a retirement plan, as in LF’s case, was not 
enough to constitute a “substantial financial hardship” (id. at 
17).  These arguments are not persuasive.  As we have 
discussed supra, the factors listed in Application Note 4(F) 
                                              
10 We note that the appendix containing the victim impact 
statements is sealed. The panel notified counsel for both 
parties of its intent to make reference to some of the contents 
of the victim impact statements and received no objection to 
their disclosure.  
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are not exhaustive, and the financial burden of filing a lawsuit 
and proceeding with litigation is not only a relevant factor but 
also potentially indicative of the magnitude of the loss to CD 
given that it was apparently substantial enough to move her to 
pursue litigation.  LF’s entire victim impact statement, which 
the District Court incorporated into its findings, likewise 
offers sufficient examples of life consequences that the 
District Court was justified in construing as a “substantial 
financial hardship.”11  Therefore, given CD’s and LF’s 
respective impact statements, as well as the criteria required 
by “substantial,” we reject Poulson’s challenge to his 
sentence insofar as it relates to these two victims and hold 
that the District Court did not commit legal error in finding 
that CD and LF endured “substantial financial hardship” 
under the Guidelines.  
 
ii.  Victims BDA, CS, SO, SP, SB, and NN 
 BDA’s loss of $16,000 to Poulson sabotaged her plan 
to use her investment with Poulson to purchase a home for 
herself and her 87-year-old sister.  We are not persuaded by 
Poulson’s argument that the District Court plainly erred on 
the grounds that that “this hardship is not akin to being forced 
to leave a home.”  (Appellant’s Br. 16.)  To the contrary, it 
comfortably fits in with the factors of “suffering substantial 
                                              
11 For example, LF wrote in a letter to the District Court 
that the monetary loss forced her to shorten her maternity 
leave and postpone purchasing a car and home.  Contrary to 
Poulson’s assertion, these impacts on her life surely signal 
significant financial difficulty.  
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loss of a . . . savings or investment fund,” Application Note 
4(F)(iii), and “substantial changes to . . . living 
arrangements,” Application Note 4(F)(v).   
 
 CS lost $9,500 in a joint investment account with his 
wife, a loss that CS stated “impacted [their] savings 
substantially and altered [his] wife’s retirement plans.”  (A. 
252.)  SO and his wife, who is completely reliant on SO for 
retirement savings, invested $13,000 in a retirement account 
with Poulson.  His fraud cost them the principal as well as 
$3,120 in interest—approximately 25% of their total 
retirement savings.  Poulson urges that the District Court 
erroneously applied the enhancement based on CS and SO, 
reasoning that there was no “substantial financial hardship 
merely because their retirement plans were ‘altered’ or 
‘impacted’” and noting that “there was no indication that 
these victims actually had to delay their retirements.”  
(Appellant’s Br. 17.)  But the Guidelines do not in any way 
indicate that “substantial financial hardship” is conditional on 
retirement delay, and the application was therefore not clear 
error.   
 
Poulson similarly contends that SP, SB, and NN 
should not have qualified as having endured “substantial 
financial hardship,” though he does not articulate his 
reasoning.  SP lost $42,250 in an investment fund, forcing 
him to work additional side jobs; SB lost $10,000 in a 
retirement fund; and NN, along with his wife, lost $11,000 in 
a retirement fund to Poulson, forcing them to restart their 
retirement savings “from scratch” (A. 256).  The record 
supports the District Court’s finding that all of these losses 
amounted to “substantial financial hardship,” and Poulson has 
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not cited to anything that would indicate it was clear error for 
the District Court to apply the enhancement accordingly.   
 
 We recognize Poulson’s argument that by virtue of 
including the word “substantial,” the Commission intended a 
limiting principle to confine the application of § 2B1.1.  (See 
Appellant’s Br. 17 (“Although LF specified that she and her 
husband had to work longer to make up the money that they 
had lost, that is necessarily true of any victim who loses 
money from a retirement fund.”).)  But we are not persuaded 
that the Commission intended the enhancement to be as 
limited, or as difficult to satisfy, as Poulson urges.  Indeed, 
Application Note 4(F) itself states that its explanatory factors 
are not exhaustive, and the other courts that have reviewed § 
2B1.1 have all emphasized the sentencing court’s 
considerable discretion in determining where on the “wide 
range” between “a minimal loss or hardship . . . and a 
devastating loss” a particular victim’s loss might fall.  
Minhas, 850 F.3d at 878; see also Brandriet, 840 F.3d at 561–
62.  To that end, though Poulson is determined that the 
enhancement cannot possibly be justified by all of the victims 
identified by the District Court, he has not explained how the 
District Court’s inclusion of these eight victims amounts to 
plain error such that “the legal error [was] clear or obvious, 
rather than subject to reasonable dispute.”12  Puckett, 556 
U.S. at 135; see also United States v. Clark, 237 F.3d 293, 
                                              
12 Beyond the considerable latitude afforded by the 
Guidelines, Poulson arguably faces an even higher hurdle to 
demonstrating that the error was “clear or obvious” given the 
scarcity of case law on this recently enacted enhancement.  
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298–99 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734) 
(holding that an argument that was “plausible” and “within 
the range of possibility” was not enough to show that an error 
was “clear under current law”). 
 
B.  Terms of Supervised Release 
 Poulson’s next challenges the District Court’s 
imposition of a five-year occupational restriction as part of 
the terms of his supervised release.  Because Poulson failed to 
object to this term at sentencing, we review the challenge for 
plain error.  Fountain, 792 F.3d at 318. 
 
 Poulson argues that the District Court erred by 
imposing an occupational restriction that bars him from 
working in the real estate industry for five years because 
Poulson’s term of supervised release is only three years, 
which is the statutory maximum.13  The Government 
concedes that the statutory maximum prohibits an 
occupational restriction for more than three years and that “a 
limited remand is appropriate . . . [to] allow the District Court 
to correct the sentence so that the occupational restriction is 
coterminous with the term of supervised release.”  
(Appellee’s Br. 39.) 
 
 The parties are correct on the relevant law.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583 authorizes a sentencing court to impose a term of 
                                              
13 Poulson does not contest the three-year term of 
supervised release or the occupation restriction during those 
three years.   
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supervised release that follows a defendant’s term of 
imprisonment.  The statute sets the maximum term of 
supervised release based on the offense of conviction.  18 
U.S.C. § 3583(b).  In this case, Poulson pled guilty to one 
count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which is 
a Class C felony.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3) (Class C felony 
is one for which maximum prison sentence is between 10 and 
25 years); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (maximum prison sentence for 
mail fraud is 20 years).   The District Court was therefore 
only authorized to impose a maximum term of three years’ 
supervised release on Poulson.  Because the District Court 
imposed, as a term of supervised release, an occupational 
restriction lasting five years, this part of Poulson’s sentence 
amounted to plain error.  See United States v. Lewis, 660 F.3d 
189, 192 (3d Cir. 2011) (“A sentence that exceeds the 
statutory maximum constitutes plain error.”). 
 
 We will therefore vacate and remand this case to the 
District Court for the “sole and limited purpose of correcting 
the sentence . . . to reflect the applicable statutory 
provisions.”  United States v. Kukafka, 478 F.3d 531, 540 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  The occupational restriction cannot exceed three 
years.  
 
III.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Poulson’s 
sentence with respect to the § 2B1.1 “substantial financial 
hardship” enhancement, and we will vacate and remand the 
case to the District Court to correct the sentence with respect 
to the terms of Poulson’s supervised release only.  
